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C HAP T E R 13 
Torts 
PETER A. DONOVAN 
A. NEGLIGENCE 
§13.1. Negligence: Foreseeability: Dramshop liability. A possessor 
of land which is open to the public for business purposes must exercise 
due care to protect the public, while on his land, from injury by the 
acts of third persons. If he fails to do so, he is liable for the third per-
son's acts even if the acts were accidental, negligent or intentional.1 In 
a series of cases applying these principles during the past few years, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has further held that a dramshop owner is 
liable if he negligently sells liquor to an inebriated patron who then 
injures another customer. Indeed, liability has 'been extended not only 
to other customers injured on the premises,2 but also to non-customers 
who are injured in a collision with the drunken patron's automobile while 
he is on his way home,3 and to guests in the patron's own automobile.4 
Another case of this genre came before the Supreme Judicial Court for 
decision this year.5 It is best understood against the background of two 
prior decisions. 
In Addison v. Green Cafe, Inc.,6 the Court denied recovery to a cus-
tomer who was accidentally shot by another patron in the defendant's 
establishment. Just before the shooting, an argument had erupted among 
several customers and the defendant's employees attempted to quiet the 
belligerents and summon a police officer employed by the defendant. 
Another customer, who was seated some distance away and nqt in-
volved in the altercation, suddenly began shooting a gun carelessly in an 
apparent attempt to end the disturbance, and one shot hit the plaintiff. 
The Court sustained a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant, holding that 
PETER A. DONOVAN is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§l3.1. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §344 (1965); Rawson v. Massa-
chusetts Operating Co., Inc., 328 Mass. 558, 105 N.E.2d 220 (1952); Greco v. 
Sumner Tavern, Inc., 333 Mass. 144, 128 N.E.2d 788 (1955). 
2 Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 
(1969), discussed in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.8. 
3 Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968), dis-
cussed in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§3.14, 3.15. See also Three Sons, Inc. v. 
Phoenix Insurance Co., 357 Mass. 271,257 N.E.2d 774 (1970) (companion case). 
4 Cf. Dimond v. Sacilotto, 353 Mass. 501, 233 N.E.2d 20 (1968), discussed 
in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§3.4, 3.14. 
5 Sweenor v. 162 State Street, Inc., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 697, 281 N.E.2d 280. 
6 323 Mass. 620, 84 N.E.2d 33 (1949). 
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the act of shooting was "an act of human volition emanating from a new 
source entirely independent of the defendant and was not a normal 
response to any situation . . . brought about by any negligence of the 
defendant."7 This intervening cause exonerated the owner. 
In the second case, Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc.,a a cus-
tomer in the defendant's establishment was shot by another patron who 
was a known troublemaker and was "absolutely drunk" and boisterously 
staggering about the premises at the time of the incident. This time the 
Court sustained a verdict for the plaintiff against the tavern keeper: 
Serving hard liquor, particularly to one already drunk, has a con-
sequence which is not open to successful dispute [and] may well 
make the individual unreasonably aggressive, and enhance a condition 
in which ... almost any irrational act is foreseeable.9 (Emphasis 
added) . 
If the Carey decision contained any ambiguity, that ambiguity was 
resolved against the dramshop owners in 1972. In Sweenor v. 162 State 
Street, Inc.,10 the plaintiff was injured in the defendant's drinking es-
tablishment when he tried to prevent an inebriated patron from faIling 
off his bar stool. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant 
because he believed that" 'the action of the person falling off the stool 
and injuring the plaintiff was not the kind of violence intended by the 
... [Carey decision].' "11 He had apparently relied on language in Carey 
to the effect that "[t]he specific kind of harm need not be foreseeable 
as long as it was foreseeable that there would be harm. . . , provided 
it was foreseeable that there would be violence toward others."12 The 
Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal, reversed because, it said, that 
language had been intended only to summarize the trial court's 
charge to the jury, and not to be a comprehensive statement of the law. 
"The jury would have been warranted in finding that the patron's falling 
from the bar stool was predictable and that the instinctive reaction of 
one in a nearby position would be to try and catch the falling patron."13 
Such findings by implication, would require a judgment for the plaintiff. 
Since the dramshop cases generally recognize that the consequences of 
consuming alcohol are varied, the class of foreseeable and actionable 
injuries must be equally broad. 
§13.2. Negligence: Sudden emergency. Chapter 89 of the General 
Laws provides in Section 8 that the driver of a motor vehicle approach-
ing an intersection shall grant the right of way to any vehicle which 
7 Id. at 622, 84 N.E.2d at 34. This case is more fully analyzed in 1969 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law U.8. 
a 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969). 
9 Id. at 453, 245 N.E.2d at 422. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 697, 281 N.E.2d 280. 
11 Id. at 698, 281 N.E.2d at 281. . 
12 355 Mass. at 454, 245 N.E.2d at 423. 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 699, 281 N.E.2d at 282. 
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has already entered the intersection. During the 1972 SURVEY year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court was asked to determine the effect of such right 
of way when it is raised as a defense in an action for negligence. In 
Ballinger v. Plymouth and Brockton Street Ry.,l the Court said: 
[E]ven if the driver was entitled to the right of way under the statute, 
this right is not absolute and cannot absolve the operator of the duty 
to use due care. Possession of the right of way is ... only one factor 
for the jury to take into account in determining whether an operator 
performed his duty of due care or was negligent.2 
This holding is consistent with the Massachusetts rule that the violation 
of a statute may be evidence of negligence, but does not constitute negli-
gence per se.3 
Ballinger also raised an evidentiary problem. Plaintiff alleged she was 
injured when defendant's truck suddenly cut in front of the bus in which 
she was riding and forced the bus driver to slam on the brakes. However, 
she was unable to establish the distance between the truck and the bus 
at the time when the bus driver applied the brakes. There was evidence 
that the truck was traveling faster than the bus and pulled in front of 
the bus from a position parallel to it, and that both vehicles simultaneously 
entered the access road where the incident occurred. The evidence also 
indicated that the truck's passing in front of the bus, the sudden applica-
tion of the brakes, and the final stopping of the bus, all occurred within 
a distance of fifty feet. The Court said: 
This [evidence] permitted the inference that the truck was unreason-
ably close to the bus when it turned in front of the bus, thus creating 
an emergency. In these circumstances, evidence of the distance be-
tween the vehicles was not necessary to present a jury question.4 
§13.3. Liability of a corporation and its officers for negligence. In 
Leavitt v. Glick Realty Corp} the Supreme Judicial Court upheld di-
rected verdicts entered on behalf of corporate officers in a negligence 
action even though it allowed recovery against their corporation in the 
same suit. The action arose out of an electrical fire caused by a com-
bination of circumstances involving overloads of an electrical system in 
a building owned and managed by the defendant-corporation. 
The individual officers had engaged an independent electrical contrac-
tor to make repairs to the building, instructing him to do whatever was 
necessary, no questions asked.2 Since the individual defendants had in 
no way contributed to the injury, the Court held that they were not 
§13.2. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 278 N.E.2d 398. 
2 Id. at 189, 278 N.E. 2d at 400. 
3 Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 516, 167 N.E. 235, 
242 (1929); Milbury v. Turner Centre System, 274 Mass. 358, 174 N.E. 471 
(1931) . 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 189, 278 N.E.2d at 399-400. 
§ 13.3. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1489, 285 N.E.2d 786. The case is also discussed 
in §4.5 supra. 
2 The Court indicated that the contractor could have been found to be negli-
gent in maintaining the building'S electrical system. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1489, 
1494 n.l, 285 N.E.2d 786, 790 n.l. 
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personally liable. The Court reasoned that, as laymen, the officers could 
not be expected "to be capable of perceiving defects in an electrical 
wiring system merely because they are in a building once a month to 
collect rents and, incidentally, make inspections."3 Of particular im-
portance were the facts that these defendants had no actual knowledge 
of the defective electrical system, and that they had received no com-
plaints of the sort which would reasonably lead them to believe that a 
dangerous condition existed.4 It is reasonable to assume from the Court's 
reasoning that the individual defendants would have been liable to the 
corporation if they had been instructed to order an inspection of the 
electrical system but failed to do so. " '[A]n agent ... or an officer of a 
corporation . . . is not liable for nonfeasance to anyone but his principal 
or employer.' "5 
The Court's disposition with respect to the defendant-corporation's 
higher duty of care which arose from its ownership and leasing of the 
apartment building. The evidence led the Court to conclude that the 
defective condition existed in an area of the building which was under 
the control of the corporation, and that the corporation "had the duty 
the control of the corporation, and that the corporation "had the duty 
of using due care to see that the wiring within [that area] remained in a 
reasonably safe condition."6 In addition, since "[e]lettricity constitutes a 
dangerous instrumentality,'" and since the corporation had failed for 
twenty-seven years to have the building's electrical system inspected by 
a competent person, the Court held that the question of the corporation's 
negligence was properly submitted to the jury. 
§13.4. Business invitees: Social guests: Distinctions.* Under Massa-
chusetts law a host owes the duty of ordinary care to a business invitee1 
3 Id. at 1491, 285 N.E.2d at 788. 
4Id. 
5 Id. at 1492, 285 N.E.2d at 788, quoting from Tibbetts v. Wentworth, 248 
Mass. 468, 472, 143 N.E. 349, 350 (1924). 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1489, 1494, 285 N.E.2d 786, 789. See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §361 (1965) (cited by Court). 
, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1489, 1494, 285 N.E.2d 786, 789, citing Gelinas v. 
New England Power Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 429, 268 N.E.2d 336 (1971). 
* EDITOR'S NOTE: As this 'article goes to press, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
rendered a decision in Mounsey v. Ellard, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, N.E.2d , 
which abolishes the common law distinctions between the duties owed to licensees 
and various kinds of invitees. Chief Justice Tauro wrote for the majority: "We 
can no longer follow this ancient and largely discredited common law distinction 
which favors the free use of property without due regard to the persona1 safety 
of those individuals who have heretofore been classified as licensees. The problem 
of allocating the costs and risks of human injury is far too complex to be decided 
solely by the status of the entrant, especially where the status question often 
prevents the jury from ever determining the fundamental question whether the 
defendant has acted reasonably in the light of all the circumstances in the par-
ticular case." Id. at 884-85, N.E.2d . However, the underlying rationale of 
the ancient distinctions was preserved to some extent in the proviso that "the fore-
seeability of the visitor's presence and the time, manner, place and surrounding 
circumstances of his entry remain relevant factors which will determine 'in part 
the likelihood of injury to him, and the extent of the interest which must be 
sacrificed to avoid the risk of injury.' " Yd. at 887, N.E.2d. 
§ 13.4. 1 SchaIIinger v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 334 Mass. 386, 
135 N.E.2d 655 (1956). 4
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but only the duty of slight care to a social guest or a licensee.2 Thus, a 
business invitee can recover for injuries sustained as a result of the 
ordinary negligence of his host3 while a guest or licensee can recover 
only for those injuries caused by conduct which is grossly negligent.4 
This distinction, predicated upon traditional common law concepts, has 
not proved entirely satisfactory, and it has engendered much litigation 
on the question of what circumstances create a host-guest relationship as 
opposed to that of host-invitee . .5 The question arose in a new context 
during this SURVEY year. 
In Huska v. Clement6 the plaintiff made a prearranged visit to his 
father-in-Iaw's farm, to assist him in gathering up and storing bales of 
hay. In the course of loading the hay on a truck, the plaintiff was injured 
through the admittedly negligent conduct of his father-in-law. The Court 
ruled that a jury could properly conclude that the work performed by 
the plaintiff for his father-in-law was "'the dominant aspect of the re-
lationship rather than a routine incident of social or group activities'" 
and, therefore, that the plaintiff was a business invitee entitled to recover 
on proof of ordinary negligence.7 . 
The Huska decision demonstrates that the "invitee" status may be con-
ferred upon one who is benefiting a relative. The plaintiff was probably 
motivated to assist his father-in-law out of social considerations, since 
he received no financial rewards for the work performed. Nevertheless 
it is the nature of the benefit conferred rather than the reasons for con-
ferring that benefit which controls the characterization of the legal re-
lationship.8 
§13.5. Child care centers: Duty of proprietors. A rapidly growing 
social institution is the "day care" center for young children of working 
mothers. Many of these centers are newly organized institutions which 
mayor may not be adequately staffed and supervised. Their emergence 
gives rise to several perplexing questions regarding the liability of those 
who have assumed care of children, be they proprietors, employees, or 
volunteers, and regarding the validity of releases and covenants not to 
sue which are given by parents either before or after an injury has been 
sustained. The Supreme Judicial Court had occasion to consider one of 
these questions during this SURVEY year, and in Brown v. Knight l it 
2 Holiday v. First Parish Church of Groton, 339 Mass. 692, 162 N.E.2d 48 
(1959); Palter v. Zarnisky, 338 Mass. 256, 155 N.E.2d 158 (1959). 
3 Marra v. Botta Corp., 356 Mass. 569, 254 N.E.2d 418 (1970); Carey v. 
New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969). 
4 E.g., Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917) . 
.5 E.g., O'Brien v. Shea, 326 Mass. 681, 96 N.E.2d 163 (1951); Zaia v. "Italia" 
Societa Anonyma di Navigazione, 324 Mass. 547, 87 N.E.2d 183 (1949); Kelly 
v. Goldberg, 288 Mass. 79, 192 N.E. 513 (1934); Grogan v. O'Keeffe's Inc., 
267 Mass. 189, 166 N.E. 721· (1929). See also 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.8. 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 695, 281 N.E.2d 225. 
7 Id. at 696, 281 N.E.2d at 227, quoting Pandisc4> v. Bowen, 342 Mass. 435, 
438, 173 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1961). 
8 See Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (1934), wherein the 
Court stated that the benefit conferred must have "a business or commercial 
significance." Id. at 581, 189 N.E. at 589. 
§13.5. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1469, 285 N.E.2d 790. 
5
Donovan: Chapter 13: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
§13.6 TORTS 325 
formulated the duty for those offering remunerative custodial care as 
follows: 
In taking for pay custody of Susan a [four year old] child unable 
to care for herself, in place of her parents or regular guardians, the 
defendant had an onerous duty to protect Susan from foreseeable 
harm, including a duty to take affirmative protective acts and a 
duty to protect her from the foreseeable conduct of third persons 
[including other minors].2 (Emphasis added). 
The use of the term "onerous duty" is new but seems intentional since 
it appears twice in the opinion.3 Because the facts and evidentiary ad-
missions of the defendant clearly establish the prerequisites for a tradi-
tional negligence action, the precise effect of an "onerous duty" remains 
unclear. However, the opinion does suggest that it is at least an affirma-
tive duty to act and protect where the safety of children is at stake. 
Brown may prove to be the precursor of a new body of law concerned 
with the duties, liabilities and regulation of business institutions engaged 
in the care of children. Indeed, the legislature this year added Chapter 
28A to the General Laws,4 establishing a new agency within the execu-
tive branch of the Commonwealth to be known as the Office for Children. 
The statute, which is quite complex, places the licensing, regulation, 
placement and monitoring of day care, foster care and group care ser-
vices, centers and facilities within the newly created state office.5 The 
regulations promulgated under the rule-making power of Sections 4 and 
lO(c) of the new statute may furnish an additional standard of care 
for the operation and management of child care centers. Although the 
violation of statutes, ordinances, and regulations is not negligence per se 
in Massachusetts, violations may yet be admissible as evidence of negli-
gence as to consequences that the statute or regulation was intended to 
prevent.6 
§13.6. Landlord and tenant: Duty to repair. It has long been the 
law in Massachusetts that a landlord is not liable for injuries resulting 
from unsafe conditions existing within the leased premises unless they 
constitute concealed dangerous defects known to the landlord but not 
disclosed to the tenant. 1 Furthermore, the existence of a clause in a 
lease reserving to the landlord a right of entry to make repairs has been 
held insufficient to impose a duty upon the landlord to make repairs.2 
2 Id. at 1471, 285 N.E.2d at 792. 
3 Id. 
4 Acts of 1972, c. 785. 
5 Acts of 1972, c. 785, adding G.L., c. 281, §4. 
6 Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 516, 167 N.E. 235, 
242 (1929); Milbury v. Turner Centre System, 274 Mass. 358, 174 N.E. 471 
(1931). 
§13.6. 1 E.g., Stone v. Sheperd Building Corp., 351 Mass. 705, 221 N.E.2d 
878 (1966) (Rescript opinitm). 
2 E.g., Dubay v. Cambridge Housing Authority, 352 Mass. 770, 225 N.E.2d 
374 (1967). 
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AnQther judicially imposed rule requires that a landlord need exercise 
only reasonable care to keep common areas within the building in the 
same condition in which they were, or appeared to be, when the lease 
was made.3 During the 1972 SURVEY year three statutes directly 'Or in-
directly affecting the duty of care owed by a landlord were enacted. They 
demQnstrate that significant steps are being taken to reverse an earlier 
trend of landlQrd protectionism in the CommQnwealth. 
Chapter 665 of the Acts of 19724 imposes upon landlords5 the duty 
tQ use reasonable care to correct unsafe conditions within a reasonable 
time following receipt of written notice given by registered or certified 
mail. Notice of unsafe conditions existing in common areas is, hQwever, 
not required. The duty extends to all unsafe conditiQns nQt caused by 
the tenant, his invitee or others occupying through or under the tenant. 
The tenant, 'Or any person rightfully on the premises, is expressly given 
the right to bring an action in tort against the landlord 'Or lessQr to re-
cover damages for injuries sustained as a result of the failure to correct 
the unsafe condition within a reasonable time. Any waiver, of these pro-
visions in a lease 'Or other rental agreement is VQid and unenforceable. 
Notice 'Of unsafe conditions may be given either by the tenant or by the 
board of health or other code enforcement officials where there has been 
a violation 'Of a sanitary code, by-law, ordinance, rule or regulation. 
Chapter 665 raises several interpretational questions with which the 
courts will have to deal. Since Chapter 665 expressly recognizes a right 
of action fQr injuries which arise from unsafe conditions, query whether 
the Chapter may be construed to abolish by implication the defense of 
assumption of the risk. 
Of greater interpretational importance is the relationship between 
Chapter 665 and Chapter 157 'Of the Acts of 1972.6 Chapter 665, im-
poses upon landlords a duty to reasonably repair unsafe conditions, and 
the duty applies tQ common areas on the leased premises as well as to 
areas under the control of the landlord.? As to common areas the duty 
arises when a condition is "unsafe," regardless 'Of the condition of such 
areas at the time 'Of letting. Therefore, Chapter 665 completely 'Over-
rules a long line of Massachusetts cases which established that the land-
lord's duty with regard to common areas was simply to use reasonable 
care to keep such areas in as good a condition as they were in when the 
tenancy began.8 Chapter 157, however, took a cQmpletely different ap-
3 E.g., Marsh v. Goldstein, 341 Mass. 83, 167 N.E.2d 158 (1960). 
4 Adding G.L., c. 186, §19. 
5 Excluded from the provisions of Chapter 665 are the landlords of owner-
occupied two or three family dwellings. 
6 Adding G.L., c. 186, §i5E. 
7 In fact, since Chapter 665 expressly provides that "notice need not be given 
for unsafe conditions in that portion of the premises not under the control of 
the tenant," Chapter 665 seems to impose upon the- landlord the duty to both 
inspect and repair defects in common areas. 
8 Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1969); 
7
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proach to that common law doctrine by precluding a landlord " ... from 
raising as a defense in an action brought by a lessee, tenant, or occupant 
... who has sustained an injury caused by a defect in a common area, 
that said defect existed at the time of the letting ... , if said defect is 
at the time of the injury a violation of the building code [of the govern-
ing municipality]." (Emphasis added). Thus Chapter 157 abolishes the 
defense (of condition at the time of letting) only in cases where the 
defect is a building code violation, whereas Chapter 665 seems to have 
completely abolished the defense. Nor are the two chapters easily rec-
oncilable. If Chapter 157 controls in actions involving injuries from 
common area defects, then under Chapter 665 the landlord's liability 
would be greater for areas controlled by the tenant than for areas con-
trolled by the landlord. On the other hand, if Chapter 665 controls, then 
the partial abolition of the defense in Chapter 157 would be superceded. 
Ultimately the relationship between these mutually inconsistent chapters 
will have to be resolved by the legislature or by the courts. 
Chapter 799 of the Acts of 19729 provides that under certain stated 
conditions tenants may use rent money to repair, or have repaired, defects 
in the premises which constitute "violations of the standards of fitness 
for human habitation as established by the state sanitary code, or of 
other applicable ordinances, by-laws, rules or regulations, [which] may 
endanger or materially impair the health, safety or well being of a 
tenant." However, the existence of such conditions must be certified by 
a designated public official or a court before the right becomes operative. 
The tenant is not permitted to deduct more than two month's rent in 
any twelve month period, or period of occupancy, whichever is shorter. 
Alternatively, the statute provides that the tenant may elect to treat the 
lease or rental agreement as abrogated, paying only the fair value for 
use and occupancy and vacating the premises within a reasonable time. 
The rights afforded by the new statute may not be invoked if the tenant 
has unreasonably denied the landlord access to the dwelling unit or if 
the violation results from conditions caused by the tenant or by a person 
in his family or household, or by his invitees or guests. Additionally, 
Chapter 799 provides that its rights are cumulative to any other remedies 
available to tenants by law and declares that any attempted waiver of 
its benefits is "against public policy and void" except in a lease of two 
year's duration (not counting renewal periods) where the tenant cove-
nants to make specific repairs or renovations "in consideration for a 
substantially lower rent." 
Healey v. Bedrick, 352 Mass. 772, 225 N.E.2d 371 (1967); Campbell'v. Romanos, 
346 Mass. 361, 191 N.E.2d 764 (1963); Marsh v. Goldstein, 341 Mass. 83, 167 
N.E.2d 158 (1960). 
9 Adding G.L., c. 111, § 127L. 
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B. WRONGFUL DEATH 
§13.7. Wrongful death: Conscious suffering: Statute of limitations. 
During the SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Gaudette v. 
Webb,1 re-examined actions for wrongful death under G.L., c. 229, §2. 
In Gaudette the plaintiff-administratrix brought an action to recover 
damages for the wrongful death and conscious suffering of her husband. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint because almost three years had 
elapsed between the dates of the accident and death of plaintiff's husband 
and the commencement of the suit; the statutes of limitations for wrong-
ful death and conscious suffering are one year and two years respectively. 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court first considered plaintiff's 
actions for conscious suffering and held that the two year limitation 
period of G.L., c. 260, §4 did not apply in this case. G.L., c. 228, §1 
provides that a decedent's cause of action for conscious suffering survives 
his death. His personal representative is then protected by G.L., c. 260, 
§10, which permits executors and administrators to commence such an 
action within two years of their appointment and posting of bond. 
. Plaintiff's action for wrongful death raised more difficult questions 
because of earlier Massachusetts decisions holding that wrongful death 
actions were entirely statutory in nature.2 The wrongful death statute 
expressly provides a one year limitation period.3 Plaintiff first argued 
that the time during which she might bring such an action was extended 
by G.L., c. 260, §10. The Court dismissed this argument, reasoning that 
that statute applies only to actions which "the deceased might have 
brought" and, therefore, not to wrongful death actions which may be 
commenced only "by the executor or administrator of the deceased."4 
Plaintiff then argued, on behalf of deceased's three minor children, 
that G.L., c. 260, §7 tolled the statute of limitations in favor of minors 
during their minority. Earlier decisions had held that the period of limita-
tion in the wrongful death statute was a "limitation of the right as well 
as of the remedy."5 If the right to bring an action for wrongful death 
were indeed purely statutory, and if the statutory right expired, by its 
own express terms, one year after the fatal accident, then G.L., c. 260, §7 
could not restore that right. However, on plea of the plaintiff, the Court 
re-examined its position on the origin and nature of wrongful death 
actions and concluded that "the law in this Commonwealth has also 
evolved to the point where it may now be held that the right to recovery 
§13.7. 11972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1131, 284 N.E.2d 222. 
2 See Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475,478 (1848), and other 
cases cited in Gaudette v. Webb, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1134·35 n.2, 284 N.E.2d 
at 225-26 n.2. 
3 G.L., c. 229, 12. 
4 Id. See also Bickford v. Furber, 271 Mass. 94,99, 170 N.E. 796,798 (1930), 
where the Court held G.L., c. 260, §10 inapplicable to a death action even 
though it found that G.L., c. 260, H, applied to the case. 
5 Wescott v. Henshaw Motor Co., 275 Mass. 82, 86, 175 N.E. 153, 155 (1931); 
see also Birkf'ml v. Furber, 271 Mass. 9'1-, 170 N.E. 796 (1930). 
9
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for wrongful death is of common law ongm, and we so hold."6 The 
scope and impact of this change in judicial attitude are detailed in the 
following extract: 
Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will no longer be re-
garded as 'creating the right' to recovery for wrongful death. They 
will be viewed rather as: (a) requiring that damages recoverable 
for wrongful death be based upon the degree of the defendant's 
culpability; (b) prescribing the range of the damages recoverable 
against each defendant; (c) requiring that any action for wrongful 
death be brought by a personal representative on behalf of the 
designated categories of beneficiaries; and (d) requiring that the 
action be commenced within the SJlecified period of time, as a limita-
tion upon the remedy and not upon the right. We further hold that 
the statutes limiting the period for bringing actions for death are 
to be construed in the same manner as the limitations contained in 
G.L. c. 260, the general statute of limitations, and that in appropri-
ate cases they may be tolled by the various provisions of G.L. c. 260. 
To the extent that ... any other prior decisions of the court con-
flict with our present holding, those decisions are no longer to be 
followed.' 
Applying this new approach to the facts in Gaudette, the Court held 
that the action for wrongful death was properly maintaina:ble on behalf 
of the deceased's children, but not on behalf of his widow. The children 
were protected by c. 260, §7. However, their mother, who had unduly 
delayed in obtaining appointment as administratrix, was barred, in her 
individual capacity, from receiving the one-third share of the proceeds 
of the death action which would otherwise be allocable to her through 
the estate of her deceased husband. In order to prevent the disqualifica-
tion of the mother from operating to reduce the damages for which 
defendant was liable (a result which would be inappropriate under G.L., 
c. 229, §2 which fixes the amount recoverable in wrongful death actions 
by the gravity of the defendants' fault) the Court held that the full 
amount of his liability should be recovered by the plaintiff in her capacity 
as administratrix for the sole benefit of the deceased's children.8 
The decision to recognize a common law basis for wrongful death 
actions is consistent with an underlying policy to mitigate the hardship 
which inevitably results from the loss of a family breadwinner. Gaudette 
cites and follows Moragne v. States Marine Lines,9 a 1970 Supreme 
Court decision which, in similar circumstances, found a common law 
right to recover for wrongful death under the general maritime law. 
Justice Harlan, for a unanimous Court, wrote: 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1131, 1140, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229. 
, Id. at 1140-41, 284 N.E.2d at 229. 
8 Id. at 1142-43, 284 N.E.2d at 230. 
9 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are 
compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of 
justice suggests that a violation should be non-actionable simply 
because it was serious enough to cause death .... Because the primary 
duty already exists, the decision whether to allow recovery for viola-
tions causing death is entirely a remedial matter. 1O 
Although Gaudette is a great step forward, it does not correct one funda-
mental problem which continues under Massachusetts law: the lack of 
compensatory damages. 
§13.8. Wrongful death: Damages. For the second consecutive year, 
the General Court has recognized the inadequacy of the Massachusetts 
wrongful death statute,1 but unfortunately it has again failed to correct 
the fundamental deficiency. Chapter 440 of the Acts of 19722 increased 
the maximum allowable recovery from $100,000 to $200,000. However, 
the amount of recovery continues to be measured by the defendant's 
culpability and not by the amount of the plaintiff's loss. The amendment 
will therefore afford larger damages to a small number of plaintiffs with-
out regard to their actual loss, but it will not affect the majority of 
plaintiffs whose recovery must depend entirely on the circumstances of 
the decedent's death. 
More than a century ago the Supreme Judicial Court was persuaded 
to follow an 1808 decision of an inferior English court3 and to hold that 
no common law action existed for wrongful death.4 A great majority of 
American jurisdictions have long since rejected that English view and 
have adopted compensatory statutes permitting the decedent's survivors 
to recover according to their loss. However, Massachusetts is not among 
them. The General Court has continued to view wrongful death as a 
quasi-criminal offense whereby damages are measured solely by the 
culpability of the defendant. For many years the maximum amount of 
recovery permitted under the Massachusetts statute remained at $20,000.5 
Repeated amendments within the past decade have successively increased 
this figure to $30,000,6 $50,000,7 $100,0008 and, finally, by the present 
amendment, to $200,000. 
It is most unfortunate that the same legislature which broke with 
precedent last year to abolish the privity defense in products liability 
10 Id. at 381-82, quoted at 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1139, 284 N.E.2d at 228. 
§13.8. 1 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
2 Amending G.L., c. 229, §2. 
3 Calter v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). Note also that the history of 
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute has been discussed in 1971 Ann. Surv. 
Mass Law §1.1; 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.3; 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law. 
§3.4. 
4 Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848). 
5 This figure was adopted by Chapter 238 of the Acts of 1958. 
6 Acts of 1962, c. 306, § 1. 
7 Acts of 1965, c. 683, § 1. 
8 Acts of 1971, c. 801, § 1. 
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litigation9 continued to adhere to this outmoded relic of the past. The 
injustice inherent in the present statute has already been noted and is 
repeated here only to underscore the need for complete change: 
The answer is not to be found in successive amendments to the 
statute increasing the maximum permissible recovery, but in the 
adoption of a compensatory statute that permits recovery without 
limit. Only under such a statute can survivors be reimbursed ade-
quately for the losses they sustain through a wrongful death. The 
present statute serves no legitimate purpose other than to limit the 
amount of recovery that insurance companies will be forced to pay; 
it is today completely outdated.10 
§13.9. Wrongful death: Stillborn and liveborn fetus. In 1969 the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, in Henry 
v. Jones,1 held that a stillborn fetus would not qualify as a "person" 
within the meaning of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute.2 This 
decision properly anticipated the decision reached this SURVEY year by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Leccese v. McDonough,3 that a fetus born 
alive is a "person" since it has "at least the theoretical possibility of 
survival and of enduring the consequences of prenatal injury throughout 
its life" w4ereas the stillborn fetus "incur[s] no such risk of continuing 
injury" and hence cannot qualify as a "person" within the provisions 
of the wrongful death statute.4 In a footnote, the Court explained: 
The distinction applied by us reduces to a minimum the risks of 
recovery based on speculation or conjecture and of encouraging 
fictitious claims. Such risks may be especially significant where the 
alleged prenatal injury and the subsequent miscarriage occur early 
in pregnancy.5 
The Court found that explicit recognition of this distinction existed in 
other statutes6 and in the Restatement of Torts,' and deferred to the 
legislature for any change in this area. 
9 Acts of 1971, c. 670, discussed in 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law. §§13.3, 13.18. 
For a summary of the history of products liability litigation in Massachusetts as 
a comparison to the departure from precedent accomplished by Chapter 670 of 
the Acts of 1971, see 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§2.1, 2.2; 1969 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §1.1; 1968 §3.3; 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.4. 
10 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.6 at 316. 
§13.9. 1 306 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1969), discussed in 1970 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§2.5, 2.21. 
2 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 191, 279 N.E.2d 339. 
4 rd. at 193, 279 N.E.2d at 341. 
5 rd. at 193-94 n.3, 279 N.E.2d at 341 n.3. 
6 The Court cited G.L., c. 46, §9, which requires a death certificate to be 
issued in the case of death after a live birth and G.L., c. 46, §9A which requires 
a certificate of fetal death to be issued where the "child is born dead" after at 
least a twenty week gestation period. 
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §869 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). 
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C. IMMUNITY 
§13.10. Governmental immunity: School committee; school teachers. 
By Chapter 513 of the Acts of 1964, the legislature enacted G.L., c. 41, 
§ 100C, which required cities, towns and regional school districts to 
indemnify teachers for expenses or damages sustained by them in 
defending personal injury tort claims. At the same time, G.L., c. 40, §5 (1) , 
was amended to permit the towns to appropriate money to provide in-
demnity insurance protecting teachers against liability covered by G.L., 
c. 41, §lOOC. There has been some feeling that these two statutes, read 
together, amount to a waiver of any governmental immunity enjoyed 
by school teachers. The Supreme Judicial Court dispelled this mistaken 
belief during this SURVEY year. 
In Desma.rais v. Wachusett Regional School District,l a child lost the 
sight of one eye when volatile and explosive chemicals used in a labora-
tory experiment exploded. An action for damages was brought on behalf 
of the child for personal injuries and on behalf of his father for con-
sequential damages. Both actions alleged negligence on the part of the 
supervising teacher in failing to require students including the minor 
child, to wear safety glasses while working with "caustic or explosive 
chemicals" as. required by G.L., c. 71, §55C. Demurrers filed by the 
defendant school teacher and school district were sustained by the trial 
court. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued both that the defendant school teacher 
was not a "public officer," and that even if he were entitled to such 
status, his conduct constituted misfeasance. Disagreeing, the Court ruled 
that teachers in public schools were public officers and therefore liable 
only for acts of misfeasance in connection with ministerial matters.2 
Since the defendant-teacher's only fault was inaction, he was guilty of 
nonfeasance only and hence not liable to plaintiffs for noncompliance 
with G.L., c. 71, §55C. The Court rejected out of hand plaintiff's addi-
tional contention that the indemnity statutes discussed above waived the 
defense of governmental immunity.3 
§I3.10. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1763, 276 N.E.2d 691. 
2 See FuIgoni v. Johnston, 302 Mass. 421, 423, 19 N.E.2d 542, 543 (1939); 
Moynihan v. Todd, 188 Mass. 301, 303, 74 N.E. 367, 368 (1905). 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1763, 1765, 276 N.E.2d 691, 693, citing Kosiba v. 
Syracuse, 260 App. Div. 557, 24 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1940), reh. den., 261 App. 884, 
25 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1940), modified on other grounds, 287 N.Y. 283, 39 N.E.2d 
240 (1942). 
For further developments in tort law as it relates to public schools, see §l3.16, 
infra, which deal's with legislative regulation of corporal punishment. 
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§13.11. LandDwners: Limitation of liability; land made available 
for public use. In this day Df ecological awareness much concern has 
centered upon the lack of suitable acreage Df open spaces and recrea-
tiDnalland. By Chapter 575 of the Acts of 1972 the General Court took 
cognizance of this situation and sought to encourage landowners to 
make land available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting 
their liability in connection with such use. Under the new statute, which 
adds Section 17C to Chapter 21 of the General Laws, a landowner who 
either permits the public to' use his land or leases his land to the state 
or a municipality fDr recreational purposes "shall not be liable" for 
personal injuries or property damages sustained by a member Df the 
public "in the absence of wilful, wantDn or reckless conduct." The 
Dwner's permission to' use the land does nDt confer upon a user "the 
status of an invitee Dr licensee to' whom any duty wDuld be Dwed by 
said [land] Dwner." HDwever, the impositiDn Df a charge or fee fDr the 
use of land by the public for recreatiDnal purposes removes the land-
Dwner from the protection Df the statute. 
§13.12. Immunity: ProfessiDnal societies and committees. Chapter 
242 of the Acts Df 1972, which adds SectiDn 85N to' Chapter 231 Df the 
General Laws, confers broad immunity upon certain professiDnals for 
action taken by them on behalf Df professiDnal societies and committees. 
Members Df professiDnal societies and their committees, including mem-
bers Df a cDmmittee of a medical staff of a licensed hospital, are covered 
by the act, which provides that they "shall [not] be liable in a suit fDr 
damages as a result of [their] acts, omissiDns Dr proceedings undertaken 
or perfDrmed within the scope of [their] duties as such cDmmittee mem-
ber[s]," provided that they act "in good faith and in the reasDnable 
belief that based Dn all of the facts the actiDn Dr inactiDn on [their] 
part was warranted." The term "professiDnal sDciety" is defined to in-
Glude "a society having as members persDns whO' are licensed Dr ad-
mitted to' practice in the field of law, medicine, chiropractic, Dptometry, 
psychiatry Dr psychology, dentistry, accDunting, engineering, or archi-
tecture." 
D. MISCELLANEOUS 
§13.13. Trade secrets. Over the years, the use by fDrmer emplDyees 
of infDrmation alleged to' be confidential by their previous employers 
has created trDublesDme probleIDS in the CDmmonwealth. The general 
rule gDverning these situatiDns, as formulated by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, is that "[i]n situatiDns where there has been nO' express contract 
Df an employee not to use or disclose confidential infDrmation entrusted 
to' him during his employment, . . . although an employee may carry 
away and use general skill or knowledge acquired during the course 
§1S.lS. 1 For an extensive discussion of trade secret law in Massachusetts as 
between employers and employees see Student Comment, §is.lS, infra. 
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of his employment, he may be enjoined from using or disclosing con-
fidential information so acquired."2 This general rule has been applied 
by the Court in several cases with varying results.3 
In the past few years, the Court has attempted to clarify the critical 
issue in all these cases, namely, whether the information which the 
former employer seeks to protect qualifies as "confidential," both in fact 
and in law, so as to be entitled to protection. Two years ago, in ]. T. 
Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc.4, the Court stated 
that "[t]he essential characteristic of a trade secret ... [is] secrecy .... 
[and] if the person entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its exclusive 
use in his own business, he must not fail to take all proper and reasonable 
steps to keep it secret."5 The Court further warned that: 
one who claims that he has a trade secret must exercise eternal 
vigilance. This calls for constant warnings to all persons to whom 
the trade secret has become known and obtaining from each an 
agreement, preferably in writing, acknowledging its secrecy and 
promising to respect it. To exclude the public from the manufactur-
ing area is not enough.6 
In another case decided during the 1972 SURVEY year the Court, while 
continuing to require that all proper and reasonable steps be taken to 
preserve secrecy, distinguished the Healy decision in part and afforded 
trade secret protection under particular circumstances without requiring 
either constant warnings or an express agreement of secrecy. In Jet Spray 
Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,' a suit against four former employees and 
their new corporation was brought by Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. seeking 
both damages and equitable relief for misappropriation of allegedly 
confidential information. The case came to the Supreme Judicial Court 
on the plaintiffs appeal from interlocutory decrees entered by the su-
perior court after the filing of a master's report and from a final decree 
dismissing plaintiffs bill in equity. 
The former employees had set up a new corporation which manu-
2 New England Overall Co., Inc. v. Woltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 75, 176 N.E.2d 
193, 198 (1961); cf. Essex Trust Co .. v. Enright, 214 Mass. 507, 511, 102 N.E. 
441, 443 (1913). 
3 See, e.g., J. T. Healey & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 
Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970) (manufacturing processes), discussed in 1970 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.14; United Tool & Industrial Supply Co., Inc. v. 
Torrisi, 356 Mass. 103, 248 N.E.2d 266 (1969) (merchandising techniques); 
New England Overall Co., Inc. v. Woltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 176 N.E.2d 193 
(1961) (customer list); Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 23 
N.E.2d 899 (1939) (customer list); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica 
Condenser Co., Ltd., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921) (manufacturing 
process) . 
4 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970). 
5 Id. at 737-38, 260 N.E.2d at 730. 
6 Id. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 731. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1047, 282 N.E.2d 921. 
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factured and sold products in competition with the plaintiff. Each of the 
four individual defendants had held an important position while in the 
employ of the plaintiff. They had access to plaintiff's customer and 
supplier lists, to information concerning certain features of plaintiff's 
products, and to knowledge contained in the report of an outside engi-
neering consultant. Plaintiff charged misuse of all three cla~s of alleged 
confidential information. Each of these "trusted employees" had also 
served on the plaintiff's so-called executive committee. According to the 
master's report, each understood that the information he possessed was 
to be used solely in the furtherance of the plaintiff's business and each 
was "also aware of the fact that it was important that competitors did 
not obtain the information .... "8 Nevertheless, the individual defendants 
utilized all of the information and knowledge which they had acquired 
while working for the plaintiff in designing and developing their com-
peting products. The master also found that sales made by defendants 
to plaintiff's customers were, in part, due to knowledge acquired by the 
defendants while in plaintiff's employ. There was no proof that the de-
fendants carried away with them any specific customer or sales lists, but 
they "were thoroughly familiar with the contents" of these lists. Applying 
the Healy formula, the Court denied relief as to aU information except 
the consultant's report because "the master's findings disclose[d] no 
proper and reasonable steps taken by plaintiffs to protect the secrecy 
of the knowledge."9 
The Court did find, however, that the defendants had improperly 
utilized technological knowledge contained in the report prepared for 
the plaintiff by the outside engineering consultants. The secrecy of this 
information had been sufficiently protected in that the plaintiff obtained 
only one copy of the report and controlled its distribution.1o Having 
stated earlier in the opinion that "no general and invariable rule can be 
laid down"l1 the Court ruled that under these circumstances there was 
no necessity for "periodic warnings and constant admonitions of secrecy 
as detailed in the Healy case .... "12 
§13.14. Strict liability: Blasting operations. Chapter 333 of the Acts 
of 1972 provides that "[a]ny person engaged in a blasting operation shall 
be liable for direct damages to the person or property of another with-
out proof of negligence."1 Despite its simplicity and apparent attempt 
to impose a rule of strict liability upon blasting operators, the impact of 
the statute is not clear. The uncertainty results from the statutory phrase 
8 Id. at 1049, 282 N.E.2d at 923. 
9 Id. at 1054, 282 N.E.2d at 926. 
10 Only two copies of the report were made; the second was retained by the 
outside firm. 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1047, 1051, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925, quoting Woolley's 
Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 389, 23 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1939). 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1047, 1055, 282 N.E.2d 921, 927. 
§13.14. 1 Acts of 1972, c. 333, adding G.L., c. 148, §20C. 
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"direct damage" as it may relate to prior case law. Under existing au-
thorities, strict liability exists for injury caused by debris thrown upon 
the other's land, while concussion or vibration damage is recoverable 
only upon proof of negligence.2 Whether the statute codifies this existing 
distinction or seeks instead to impose strict liability for both debris and 
concussion damage is unclear. Present case law defines direct damage 
as damage resulting from the physical impact of stones or debris, while 
concussion damages are characterized as consequential.3 If the statute 
merely codifies this distinction, then it is an exercise in futility and the 
legislature should direct its attention elsewhere. 
§13.15. Bailments: Automobile parking facilities: Disclaimers of lia-
bility. Chapter 165 of the Acts of 1972 has amended G.L., c. 231 by 
the insertion of the new Section 85M. This statute denies, in any action 
of contract or tort, a defense based upon "language appearing on any 
sign, ticket, or receipt" which seeks "to disclaim, limit or exclude" liability 
on the part of any "owner or operator of a privately or publicly owned 
or operated garage, lot or other facility used for the parking or storing 
of motor vehicles for a fee." Such disclaimers are declared "void as 
against public policy." The statute thus makes irrelevant the investiga-
tion or exploration of such factors as whether the owner of the motor 
vehicle read or should have read, or understood or should have under-
stood, the terms of a parking transaction as stated on a "ticket," "receipt" 
or "sign." However, it does not affect the threshold issue of whether a 
bailment or license relationship develops in a parking transaction. This 
question all too frequently controls in cases of this genre;1 a bailment re-
quires of the bailee a duty of ordinary care,2 whereas a license relation-
ship imposes upon the licensor only the duty to refrain from wilful, 
wanton or reckless conduct.3 It is possible, however, that a court might 
find in the "for a fee" language some guidance in setting up the criteria 
for a bailment. 
§13.16. Schools: Corporal punishment. By Chapter 107 of the Acts 
of 1972, the General Court has indicated its disapproval of corporal 
punishment in public education institutions. The new act adds Section 
37G to Chapter 71 of the General Laws which provides that U[t]he 
power of the school committee or of any teacher or other employee or 
agent of the school committee to maintain discipline upon school property 
shall not include the right to inflict corporal punishment upon any pupil." 
It should be noted that the statute expressly refers to the concept of 
"corporal punishment" and, therefore, imposes no new or additional 
limitation upon the traditional right of self defense applicable to school 
2 See Coughlan v. Grande & Son, Inc., 332 Mass. 464, 467, 125 N.E.2d 778, 
780 (1955). 
3 Id. 
§13.15. 1 See 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.19. 
2 Hale v. Mass. Parking Authority, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1629,265 N.E.2d 494. 
:4 Ravisini v. Auditorium, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Dec. 89 (1969). 
17
Donovan: Chapter 13: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
§13.18 TORTS 337 
teachers and other school officials when assaulted by students. Although 
Chapter 107 seems clearly intended to preclude the defense of privilege, 
based solely upon the teacher-pupil relationship, in a battery action 
brought by a pupil against a school official who uses corporal punish-
ment, it may not completely abolish corporal punishment in all circum-
stances. Common law generally recognizes a qualified privilege to use 
that amount of force reasonable under the circumstances to enforce 
discipline in schools.1 Factors traditionally considered in the application 
of this qualified privilege include the nature of the offense, the age, sex 
and strength of the pupil, his past behavior, the type of punishment and 
extent of the harm inflicted.2 While Chapter 107 seems clearly designed 
to abolish the defense of absolute privilege, it is not entirely clear that 
its intent is also to abolish the defense of qualified privilege. 
§13.17. Torts of minors: Parental responsibility. Section 85G of 
Chapter 231 of the General Laws imposes liability up to $300 in damages 
upon parents of unemancipated children between ages of eight and 
sixteen for the wilful acts of their children resulting in injury or death 
to another person or damage to his property. Chapter 552 of the Acts 
of 1972 furthers this philosophy of parental responsibility by amending 
Section 85G to increase the potential liability to $1,000 for damage to 
cemetery property resulting from the wilful act of the child. Parents 
who by reason of a judicial decree do not have custody of their children 
at the time of the commission of the tort remain free from the sanctions 
imposed by Section 85G. However, the statute raises a constitutional 
question since the dollar limitation appears to be punitive, not com-
pensatory, in nature, and the custody of the child, not the fault of the 
parent, is the basis of liability. 
E. STUDENT COMMENT 
§13.18. Trade Secrets: Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,! On Au-
gust 14, 1964, Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. filed a bill in equity in Middlesex 
Superior Court alleging that defendants had conspired to use and had sub-
sequently used technical information, supplier records and customer lists 
which were plaintiff's secrets.2 The tbi:1l sought injunctive relief, damages, 
an accounting for profits and the return of any materials which consti-
tuted or contained plaintiff's trade secrets. Named as defendants were 
Crathco, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, and four individuals who 
were officers, directors, employees and stockholders of Crathco and 
§13.16. 1 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §27 (4th ed. 1971). 
2 Id. 
§ 13.18. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1047, 282 N.E.2d 921. Plaintiffs were Jet 
Spray Cooler, Inc. and Jet Spray Corp., two Massachusetts corporations operating 
as a unit out of the same offices and plant within Massachusetts. In this com-
ment they will be referred to as plaintiff. 
2 Record at 13. 
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fonner employees of plaintiff. The defendant Crathco had been organized 
in 1962 by three of the individual defendants (Crampton, Thomson, 
and Annstrong) shortly after they resigned from plaintiff's employ. 
Crathco quickly became a competitor of plaintiff in the manufacture 
and sale of visual display beverage dispensers. The fourth defendant, one 
Landfield, had been discharged by plaintiff in May 1962 and joined 
Crathco in May 1964. 
The case was referred to a master and in September 1969, five years 
after the bill was filed, the trial court entered an interlocutory decree 
(first interlocutory decree) confinning the master's findings of fact.3 The 
trial judge concluded that certain technical infonnation, namely the 
Foster-Miller report,4 was plaintiff's trade secret and that Crathco and 
three individual defendants5 had wrongfully used that trade secret. 
Injunctive relief was denied,6 but the case was recommitted to the master 
for a determination of damages. In November 1970, during the course 
of the hearings on damages, the trial judge granted defendants' motion 
for dismissal which referred specifically to the June 1970 decision of the 
Supreme Judicial Court in J. T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy 
3 Id. at 56. The defendants pleaded laches as an affinnative defense. Six 
months after the incorporation of Crathco, the plaintiff's president saw a Crathco 
dispenser for the first time and, as he later testified, thought "that it violated 
anything that had been entrusted to" Annstrong, Crampton and Thomson. Id. 
at 48. Nevertheless, 15 additional months passed before suit was filed and over 
three years elapsed between commencement of suit and the reference of the 
case to the master. Id. at 49. Without explanation the Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled that plaintiff was not barred by laches. 
4 The Foster-Miller report comprised a consulting engineer's written recom-
mendations of design improvements to plaintiff's dispenser. Record at 37. 
5 The complaint against the defendant Landfield was dismissed because, on 
the facts, the trial judge could not conclude that Landfield had wrongfully used 
plaintiff's trade secret. Record at 57. This ruling was probably based upon the 
specific finding that Landfield had not taken papers or records belonging to plaintiff 
(Id. at 39) and upon the fact that when Landfield joined Crathco, its dispenser 
was already in production. There was no finding or inference that he had con-
tributed in any way to the development of the Crathco dispenser. The question 
of Landfield's role in the case was not argued on appeal, and the Court treated 
that aspect of the appeal as waived. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1055, 282 N.E.2d 
at 927. 
6 Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Judicial Court articulated any reasons 
for the denial of injunctive relief. The master found that a competent engineer 
could have conceived, designed and developed the Crathco dispenser without the 
benefit of the Foster-Miller report. Record at 46. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§757, comment B (1939) suggests that in cases where "the secret consists of 
mechanical improvements that a good mechanic can make without resort to the 
secret, the wrongdoer's liability maybe limited to damages, and an injunction 
against future use of the improvements made with the aid of the secret may be 
inappropriate." Since only the improvements to plaintiff's dispenser were in issue, 
arguably the Court applied the foregoing principle in denying the injunction. 
See Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 870 n.9 
(1st Cir. 1966), where the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this prin-
ciple. 
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& Son, Inc.7 Healy appeared to prescribe a general rule requiring that, 
as a prerequisite to protection, the trade secret owner constantly warn 
and admonish disclosees of the secret and make an express agreement of 
secrecy with them.8 Since the master's report in Jet Spray contained no 
indication that plaintiff had met the requirements of the Healy rule, it 
seems clear that the trial judge's decision to dismiss the Jet Spray case 
was based upon insufficiency of proof under Healy even though no 
reason was articulated in the decree of dismissal. 9 
On plaintiff's appeal the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Massa-
chusetts law of trade secrets and stated that "[t]he crucial issue to be 
determined in cases involving trade secrets, therefore, is whether 
the information sought to be protected is, in fact and in law, confi-
dential .... the result in each case depends on the conduct of the parties 
and the nature of the information."lo Emphasizing that "'no general 
and invariable rule can be laid down'''11 the Court approved six fac-
tors12 to be considered in determining whether given information is a 
trade secret. Apparently, though not specifically, the Court applied 
severa:! of these factors in determining that the Foster-Miller report was 
of an appropriate nature to qualify as a trade secret. On the question of 
secrecy the Court observed that plaintiff had procured only one copy 
of the Foster-Miller report. That copy was retained for some time by 
plaintiff's president who later personally gave it to his chief engineer, 
the defendant Armstrong, to read. The plaintiff's actions, the Court 
ruled, "clearly constituted sufficient and appropriate precautions to keep 
the report secret"13 and eliminated the necessity for the periodic warn-
ings and constant admonitions of secrecy detailed in Healy. Affirming the 
trial court's first interlocutory decree, the Court held that Crathco and 
the defendants, had wrongfully used the information contained in the 
Foster-Miller report, and remanded the case for a determination of 
damages. 
While trade secrets cases may involve any relationship between parties 
pursuant to which the trade secrets of one become known to another 
7 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970). Healy was discussed in 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §2.14. 
8 The Healy Court stated that "one who claims that he has a trade secret 
must exercise eternal vigilance. This calls for constant warnings to all persons 
to whom the trade secret has become known and obtaining from each an agree-
ment, preferably in writing, acknowledging its secrecy and promising to respect 
it." 357 Mass. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 731, citing Frederick P. Fish, Esq., of the 
Boston Bar, in 29 Proc. Am. Soc. of Mech. Engrs. 13 (1907). 
9 Record at 70. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1051, 282 N.E.2d at 925. 
11 Id., quoting from Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 389, 
23 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1939). 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1051-52, 282 N.E.2d at 925. See text at note 61, 
infra, for a listing of the six factors. 
13 Id. at 1055, 282 N.E.2d at 927. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/16
340 1972 ANNUAL SU~VEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.18 
party,I+ the cases arise most frequently from the employment relation-
ship. An employer may protect himself in two important ways from the 
threat of economic injury by former employees. Covenants not to com-
pete are enforceable in Massachusetts if they are reasonable,15 and they 
are one important means of employer protection. Even the mere existence 
of an agreement not to compete may have important deterrent value.16 
Often, however, such an agreement has not been executed or the em-
ployer may desire a measure of protection which is beyond the scope of 
an agreement not to compete. In such circumstances, the law of trade 
secrets may provide the necessary protective flexibility. The law of trade 
secrets permits the owner to disclose his secret subject to an express 
contractual duty on the part of the disclosee not to use or reveal itP 
In addition, certain relationships may afford the trade secret owner pro-
tection by operation of law even in the absence of a manifestation of 
intent by the parties. IS The employment relationship falls into this latter 
category. 
This comment will examine the common law of trade secrets as it 
applies to situations arising from the employment relationships, when 
no express contractual limitations apply. The comment undertakes to 
develop the standards applied by the Supreme Judicial Court to deter-
mine whether a particular matter disclosed in the employment relation 
is entitled to trade secret protection. First, the relational aspect of the 
standards applied by the Court will be discussed. Next, the characteriza-
tion and definition of a trade secret will be focused upon with particular 
emphasis directed to the definitional standards of secrecy and appropriate-
ness of subject matter. These definitional standards will then be used 
to analyze Healy and Jet Spray with a view toward demonstrating a 
lack of consistency and clarity that renders both decisions misleading 
even if they are correct under prior Massachusetts trade secrets -law. 
Fundamental to the issue of whether a trade secret will be afforded 
protection is the threshold determination that a confidential relationship 
exists between the plaintiff-owner of the trade secret and the defendant-
disclosee. It seems clear that a legal stranger to one's business, to whom 
disclosure is made with no agreement to maintain secrecy, may freely 
use the information to his own advantage.19 Thus, in the absence of any 
contrary agreement, a supplier may solicit the customers of a commis-
sion merchant who, when providing for a delivery of goods to his cus-
1+ MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS §4.01 at 4-1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Milgriml. 
15 See, e.g., Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 
374 (1961). 
16 For a discussion of covenants not to compete see 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
17.12. 
17 Milgrim §3.01 at 3-2. 
18 Id. 14.01 at 4-1. 
19 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 1758 (1939) indicates that under certain circum-
stances, mistaken disclosure may be corrected by notice to the disclosee. 
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tomers, divulged their names and addresses to the supplier.2o Similarly, 
if the licensor of a trade secret furnished that trade secret to a licensee 
with no agreement of confidentiality, the licensee may continue to use 
the secret to his advantage after termination of the licensing agreement, 
for there is no confidence implied by law in the licensor-licensee rela-
tion.21 At the opposite end of the spectrum of legal relationships, dis-
closure is inherently confidential when made to one who stands in a 
fiduciary capacity to the trade secret owner.22 For example, trade secret 
disclosure to one's attorney in the course of the attorney-client relation-
ship would be protected -by operation of law. It should be apparent, 
therefore, that a confidential relationship can arise in two ways. A rela-
tionship may be confidential if the parties so agree and, secondly, certain 
relationships are deemed confidential by operation of law.23 In Massa-
chusetts it appears that the employment relationship is one of confidence 
by operation of law.24 
In the 1939 case of Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva25 the Supreme 
Judicial Court stated that "[o]ut of the mere general relationship of 
employer and employee certain obligations arise, including that which 
precludes an employee from using, for his own advantage or that of a 
rival and to the harm of his employer, confidential information that he 
has gained in the course of his employment."26 The duty owed by an 
employee to his employer "spring[s] from the basic principles of equity"27 
and "rests upon the implied contract, growing out of the nature of the 
relation, that the employee will not after the termination of his service 
use information gained during the period of his employment to the detri-
ment of his former employer."28 Prior employment does not, however, 
20 Sallinger v. Conrad and Co.., 242 Mass. 58, 136 N.E. 79 (1922). 
21 Laughlin Filter Co.rp. v. Biro Mach. Co.., 319 Mass. 287, 65 N.E.2d 545 
(1946) (no. co.nfidential relatio.n inherent between a licens~r and licensee under 
a co.ntract to. furnish technical "knew-hew" co.llateral to. a patent license). But 
see Milgrim §5.03 at 5-62 (absent a contract, licensee and licens~r may stand in 
co.nfidential relatio.nship under certain circumstances). 
22 See Milgrim §5.03 at 5-64. This co.nclusio.n is implicit in an early Massa-
chusetts case where the Co.urt stated that the relationship between a co.mmissio.n 
merchant and his supplier was not co.nfidential in nature. It was "net fiduciary 
in any respect. It was net that o.f principal and agent. It was net that o.f emplo.yer 
and emplo.yee." Sallinger v. Co.nrad, 242 Mass. 58, 60, 136 N.E. 79 (1922). 
Milgrim §5.02 at 5-8 no.tes that key emplo.yees and o.fficers may also. be co.n-
sidered "fiduciaries" fer purpo.ses o.f trade secret law. 
23 Milgrim H.Ol. 
24 This is consistent with ether jurisdictions. Id. §5.02 at 5-4. Of co.urse, that is 
net to. say that a mere emplo.yment relatio.nship is fiduciary. American Stay Co.. 
v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229,97 N.E. 911 (1912) (bare master-servant relatio.nship 
is net fiduciary). 
25 304 Mass. 383, 23 N.E.2d 899 (1939). 
26 Id. at 386, 23 N.E.2d at 901. 
27 New England Overall Co.. v. Wo.ltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 76, 176 N.E.2d 193, 
198 (1961). 
28 Aronson v. Orlo.v, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 952, cert. denied, 245 U.S. 
662 (1917). 
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impose upon the former employee a duty not to compete with his former 
employer.29 In the 1946 case of Junker v. Plummer30 the Court said that 
"[tJhe law is well settled that an employee upon terminating his em-
ployment may carry away and use the general skill or knowledge ac-
quired during the course of the employment."31 It may be concluded, 
therefore, that a former employee may use .as "general skill or knowledge" 
any information that is not confidential. Stated another way, "the rights 
of the trade secret owner are limited to matters maintained in secrecy."32 
Inherent in the process of determining whether a particular matter is 
the employer's confidential information or the employee's general skill 
and knowledge is the notion of balancing the interests of the parties. 
Weighing for the employer is the interest of the public in providing in-
centives to encourage and protect technological progress and commercial 
enterprise.33 Coupled with the public interest is the employer's right to 
protection against detrimental breach of confidence by a former em-
ployee.34 Absent any protection for the employer, economic growth would 
be stifled by the need for absolute secrecy to protect competitively ad-
vantageous information. Moreover, the wrongful taking of intangible 
confidential information can be analogized to larceny. Apparently, the 
focus on the morally reprehensible means of appropriation and competi-
tive use by a former employee may tip the balance in the employer's 
favor.35 Competing with the interests in the employer's favor are the 
public policies favoring free competition and freedom of employment.36 
Put another way, the law of trade secrets represents a limitation or re-
straint on the broad right of a former employee to compete with hi~ 
ex-employer, absent a covenant not to compete.37 
29 Milgrim §5.02 at 5-15. 
30 320 Mass. 76,67 N.E.2d 667 (1946). 
31 Id. at 79, 67 N.E.2dat 669. 
32 Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 17, 29 (1971). 
33 "It is the policy of the law, for the advantage of the public, to encourage 
and protect invention and commercial enterprise." Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 
452, 457 (1868). 
34 "'[C]ourts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of 
secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment. . . .''' 
Id. at 459. 
35 See Note, Developments in the Law--Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 
888, 948 (1964), in which the author discusses the 'social undesirability of the 
means of taking a trade secret as the basis for protection. 
36 "We have considered the public interest aspect of the case, and are aware 
of the public policy against unreasonably restraining freedom of emplovment and 
the growth of monopolistic businesses." New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 
343 Mass. 69, 77-78, 176 N.E.2d 193, 199 (1961) (customer lists afforded trade 
secret protection). 
37 The argument has been made that the federal patent and anti-trust policies 
preclude or pre-empt the protection of trade secrets by state law. Painton & Co. 
v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, 442 F.2d 216 
(2d Cir. 1971). Whatever the merits of the argument, the Supreme Court has 
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The public policy aspects of balancing the interests of an ex-employee 
with those of his former employer may be more or less important depend-
ing upon the nature of the employment relation. In close cases the right 
of the former employee to compete arguably should prevail since the 
law of trade secrets is an exception to laws against monopoly38 and to 
the policy promoting free competition. The principle of protecting the 
employee's interest seems to operate in practice; the occupation of sales-
man is a good example. While a former employer's customer list may 
qualify as a trade secret, courts have generally been reluctant to enjoin 
a salesman from soliciting his former employer's customers. To do so 
may be tantamount to enjoining him from using his skills, thus severely 
restricting his freedom of employment.39 These public policy aspects of 
the employment relation are sometimes discussed explicitly in an opin-
ion,4{) but more often are not mentioned. 
Turning from the employment relationship to a consideration of the 
trade secret itself, it is interesting to note that trade secrets have been 
protected in this country ever since the leading Massachusetts case of 
Vickery v. Welch41 was decided in 1837. In Vickery the Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that a contract for conveyance of the exclusive right to a 
secret manner of making chocolate was enforceable and not a restraint 
of trade. In 1868 the Massachusetts Court, in Peabody v. Norfolk,42 con-
sidered it settled that a secret art such as a process of manufacture was 
"a legal subject of property" which a court of equity would protect.43 
The Court then cited Mr. Justice Story's 'broad statement of the basis 
of trade secret protection as it applies to the employment relation: 
[C]ourts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of 
secrets communicated to him in the course of confidential employ-
ment; and it matters not, in such cases, whether the secrets be 
secrets of trade or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party 
important to his interests.44 
not yet squarely faced the issue. State courts have not found federal law to be 
an impediment to enforcement of fundamental trade secret principles, and the 
weight of commentary seems to be on the side of continued state enforcement of 
trade secret law. See, e.g., Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton, note 32, supra; 
Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Anti-
trust Supremacy, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1432 (1967). See also Materials Dev. Corp. 
v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 595, 604 (MaslI. Super. Ct. 
1971) . 
38 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment a (1939). 
39 Milgrim §2.09 at 2-92. 
4{) See, e.g., note 36, supra. 
41 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837). 
42 98 Mass. 452 (1868). 
43 The conceptualization as "property" probably follows from the decision in 
Vickery where the alienability of a trade secret was established. 
44 98 Mass. at 459. 
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The English courts found it unnecessary to conceptualize a trade secret 
as property. When discussing the grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction 
in an 1851 case, the chancellor said: 
In some cases [jurisdiction] has been referred to property, in others 
to contract, and in others, again, it has been treated as founded upon 
trust or confidence ... but upon whatever grounds the jurisdiction 
is founded, the authorities leave no doubt as to the exercise of it.45 
However, the conceptual difficulty continues today in the United States 
and adds to the complexity of trade secret law.46 
One noted expert in trade I secret law, Roger M. Milgrim, makes a 
convincing case for the property view. He points out that the property 
characterization is often critical for certain purposes, such as providing 
a conceptual basis for the conclusion that trade secrets are capital assets 
subject to, bankruptcy claims or entitled to capital gains treatment.47 
However true this may be, any property rights inhering in a trade secret 
appear limited by the concept of relativity of title since those rights are 
only enforceable against certain persons and may be completely ex-
tinguished upon disclosure. Milgrim points out, however, that other 
property rights may also disappear, as for example when a landowner's 
rights are extinguished by an adverse possessor.48 In contrast to Milgrim, 
the Restatement of Torts rejects the suggestion that the right to exclude 
others from the use of a trade secret is based upon a right of property 
in the idea and states as a general rule that "[a]part from breach of 
contract, abuse of confidence or impropriety in the means of procurement, 
trade secrets may be copied as freely as devices or processes which are 
not secret."49 Massachusetts has recognized that one acquiring a trade 
secret by honest means may use it.50 Whatever the value of the con-
ceptual argument, most states, including Massachusetts, have at one 
time or another classified trade secrets as property or stated that owners 
have a right of property in them.51 Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial 
Court appeared to move away from the property view when it stated 
that "[t]he owner of a trade secret, in contradistinction to the owner of 
a patent, has no such right in the idea as will enable him to exclude 
others from using it."52 In recent cases such as Healy and Jet Spray the 
Court has not discussed the property aspects of trade secret law. Perhaps 
the conclusion to be drawn is that the importance attached to the 
characterization of a trade secret may depend upon the issue raised. As 
45 Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare. 241, 255, 89 R.1. 416, 427 (1851). 
46 See generally Milgrim §§ 1.01-1.10. 
47 Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton, note 32, supra, at 19 n.lO; Milgrim 
§ § 1.07, 6.04. 
48 Milgrim §1.01 at 1-6. 
49 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment a (1939). 
50 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 80, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946). 
51 Milgrim §1.01 at 1-7. 
52 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 80, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946). 
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between an employer and an ex-employee, the relationship appears to 
be the basis for civil protection of the employer's trade secret rights, 
and characterization is not in issue.53 On the other hand, if the issue is 
whether or not capital gains treatment will be allowed to the owner-
taxpayer who sells a trade secret characterization as property is essential. 54 
Given the foregoing difficulties in characterizing the nature of a trade 
secret, it is not surprising that the Restatement of Torts definiton, recog-
nized in many jurisdictions including Massachusetts,55 is more enlighten-
ing by way of example than by precise definition: 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compila-
tion of information which is used in one's business, and which gives 
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who 
do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical com-
pound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, 
a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers .... 
A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the opera-
tion of the business. Generally it relates to the production of goods, 
as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of an 
article. . . . The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. 
53 Characterization of a trade secret as tangible or intangible is important, 
however, in the determination of relief to be granted. G.L., c. 93, §42 provides 
that the trial judge may award increased damages up to double the amount found 
as actual damages for the misappropriation of tangible trade secrets. G.L., c. 266, 
§30 defines a trade secret as including "anything tangible which constitutes, 
represents, evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, pro-
duction, or management information, design, process, proceduTe, formula, in-
vention or improvement." Massachusetts also provides in G.L., c. 93, §42A that 
injunctive relIef for misappropriation of tangible trade secrets may be had re-
gardless of value. While Schneider and Hal strom, Trade Secret Protection in 
Massachusetts, 56 Mass. L.Q. 239, 259 (1971) suggest that G.L., c. 93, §42A 
overrules prior case law denying injunctive relief if there is no value in the sub-
ject, the limitation to tangible trade secrets seems to imply only that injunctive 
relief is available when the intrinsic value is very low. Thus a formula written 
on a sheet of paper should Teceive protection although the intrinsic value of the 
paper is negligible. But see Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, 
Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 595, 604 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1971), where the trial court 
ruled that the taking and use of a patent application notebook and a patent 
application, both of which comprised plaintiff's trade secret, did not constitute 
misappropriation of a tangible trade secret. The trial judge's reasoning seemed 
to be that even though the patent application and notebook were tangible objects 
they were not tangible trade secrets. But a compilation of information is expressly 
within the recognized definition of a trade secret. See text at note 56, supra. 
Certainly a tangible compilation of information as contrasted, for example, with 
a mental compilation must be a tangible trade secret. 
G.L., c. 266, §30 (4), within a section entitled Crimes Against Property, pro-
vides criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment for the misappropriation of 
tangible trade secrets. 
54 Milgrim §6.04. 
55 See J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 
736, 260 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1970). 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/16
346 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.18 
Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge In an in-
dustry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret.56 
Milgrim has capsulized the Restatement definition by stating that a trade 
secret is "data or information, or material embodiments thereof, used 
in 'the owner's business, lending a competitive advantage and not generally 
known in the owner's industry.57 As noted earlier, a trade secret may 
not include the employee's general skill or knowledge embracing any 
matter not confidential. 58 In addition, an important exception to the 
definition exists if the employee has contributed significant knowledge or 
skill in the development of his former employer's trade secret.59 The 
protection afforded the trade secret in such case may be limited in order 
to avoid unfairly restricting the employee's use of his own knowledge and 
skill.60 From the foregoing definition, two' aspects of a trade secret 
emerge. The subject matter must be both appropriate and secret. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Jet Spray approved the six factors 
that the Restatement of Torts suggests are relevant in determining 
whether given information is a trade secret: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the 
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and 
others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by 
the employer to guard the secrecy of the information; ( 4 ) the 
value of the information to the employer and to his competitors; 
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the employer in 
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with 
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by 
others.61 
It should be noted that the first three factors are related to the secrecy 
56 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment b (1939). 
57 Milgrim, From Sears to Lear to Painton, note 32, supra, at 29. Both 
definitions suggest the general rule, followed in Massachusetts, that neither novelty 
nor invention are required for a trade secret as they are for patentability. While 
the Court in New Method Die & Cut-Out Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 289 Mass. 
277, 194 N.E. 80 (1935) refused to accord trade secret status to a process that 
was arguably novel, that case was distinguished in Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 
76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946) and a quite simple machine was protected by the 
Court. Milgrim §2.08 at 2-57 takes the position that some element of value or 
usefulness should suffice. The First Circuit has clearly stated that novelty and 
invention are not required for trade secret protection as they are for patent 
protection. Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 
869 (1st Cir. 1966), citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment b (1939). 
58 See text at note 31, supra. 
59 See Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 869 
(1st Cir. 1966) (applying general law of trade secrets compatible with law of 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island). 
60 Id. 
61 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1051-52, 282 N.E.2dat 925, citing RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS §757, comment b (1939). 
27
Donovan: Chapter 13: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1972
§13.18 TORTS 347 
of the subject matter. The last three are directed to what may be termed 
the appropriateness of the subject matter and they include by implica-
tion the definitional requirements that the subject matter be used in the 
business and lend an opportunity for competitive advantage.62 The Court 
has not separately treated appropriateness of the subject matter and 
secrecy, but rather has overlapped discussion of these two inquiries, which 
treatment, it is submitted, blurs the issues and encourages the misinter-
pretation evidenced by the decision of the trial judge in Jet Spray. 
The general rule requires that the matters be relatively secret.63 Al-
though the Court implied in dictum in Club Aluminum Co. v. Young64 
that a trade secret must be known by its owner "to the exclusion of 
others,"65 this language has not been construed to require absolute se-
crecy. An employer may communicate the secret to employees involved 
in its use or to others pledged to secrecy.66 Otherwise, he would be 
precluded from making full use of his secret. Notwithstanding the fact 
that some disclosure may be made, the Court stated in Healy: "The 
essential characteristic of a trade secret [is] secrecy."67 Assuming for the 
moment that the subject matter in Healy was appropriate,68 the case 
stands as an important statement of the Supreme Judicial Court's view 
of the secrecy requirement. 
In the Healy case the trial judge, without entering a final decree, had 
confirmed a master's report and reported the case to the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court for final judgment. The master's report included the finding 
that certain dies and processes used by the plaintiff Healy & Son in the 
manufacture of jewelry were trade secrets.69 Significantly, the master 
also found that "[t]here was no written notice to employees nor ad-
monishment against discussing the processes when they should be 
outside the plant. No employee was required to sign a nondisclosure 
agreement. This was company policy based on the theory that the best 
way to guard the secret was not to excite undue interest."7o The Court 
was unable to reconcile the master's findings that certain processes were 
trade secrets with his other findings which proved that the processes were 
not guarded at all. In holding that the master incorrectly found that the 
dies and processes were trade secrets, the Court ruled that "if the per-
son entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its exclusive use in his own 
business, he must not fail to take all proper and reasonable steps to keep 
62 See text at note 56, supra. 
63 Milgrim §2.07 at 2-46. 
64 263 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804 (1928). 
65 Id. at 227, 160 N.E. at 806. 
66 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment b (1939). 
67 357 Mass. at 737, 260 N.E.2d at 730. 
68 But see text at note 78, infra. 
69 The Court focused its discussion on the processes, implying by its holding 
that the same considerations applied to the dies. 
70 357 Mass. at 736-37, 260 N.E.2d at 730. 
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it secret."71 The plaintiff's lack of affirmative action was considered 
"completely at variance with the rule 'that individuals must be con-
stantly admonished that a process is secret and must be kept so."72 The 
Court emphasized that "one who claims that he has a trade secret must 
exercise eternal vigilance. This calls for constant warnings to all persons 
to whom the trade secret has become known and obtaining from each 
an agreement, preferably in writing, acknowledging its secrecy and 
promising to respect it."73 The repetition by the Court underscored the 
requirement for constant warning and admonishment and an express 
non-disclosure agreement. Although the Court had stated in an earlier 
case that "no general and invariable rule can be laid down,"74 the Healy 
rule requiring constant admonishment was not expressly limited to any 
particular factual situation nor was there any suggestion that it should 
be. Thus, it appeared that the proper and reasonable steps essential for 
protection of trade secrets must include constant warnings and admoni-
tions, coupled with an express agreement of secrecy. 
Despite the broad language used in Healy to emphasize the proof re-
quired to establish secrecy, the Court ruled that under the circumstances 
in Jet Spray there was no necessity for the warnings and admonitions 
required by Healy. Furthermore, the requirement for an express non-
disclosure agreement was not mentioned in Jet Spray. Viewed in the 
light of the Jet Spray decision, therefore, the repetitive language in Healy 
would appear to be confined to those or similar facts. The master's 
report in Healy included a finding that the so-called secret process could 
be seen by employees engaged in other work nearby. There were no 
partitions to conceal the processes, no written notice of secrecy, no ad-
monishment against discussing the processes, nor any requirement that 
employees sign a non-disclosure agreement. In short, there appe~red to 
be absolutely no precautions taken to preserve the secret. On these facts, 
the Jet Spray decision may simply mean that the condition of secrecy 
was not met. If an employer does not treat his own secret wtih care, it 
appears that he is in effect estopped from imposing such a requirement 
on his employees. The Court cited with approval the decision of a New 
Jersey court in Gallowhur Chern. Corp. v. Schwerdle75 for the principle 
that "one may not venture on liberties with his own secret, may not 
71 Id. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 730. 
72 Id. The Court cited no case law as authority for this "rule." 
73 Id. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 731, adopting the position of Frederick P. Fish, 
Esq., in 29 Proc. Am. Soc. of Mech. Engrs. 13 (1907). 
74 Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 389, 23 N.E.2d 899, 902 
(1939). ~he q~otation in context specifically referred to cases "where an employee, 
after leaVIng hiS employment, has made use of the information obtained by him 
through lists furnished by his employer. . . ." Id. at 389, 23 N.E.8d at 902 
(emphasis added). See text at note 11, supra. 
75 37 N.J. Super. 385, 117 A.2d 416 (1955). 
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lightly or voluntarily hazard its leakage or escape, and at the same time 
hold others to be completely obligated to observe it."76 
The language in Healy requiring constant warning and admonishment 
appears, in the light of Jet Spray, to be an explanation of what the 
employer might have done to impart "legal secrecy" to his claimed trade 
secrets. The Court thus has demonstrated a willingness to make allow-
ance for the situation where a legitimate business reason or the nature 
of a particular secret precludes physical segregation from employees to 
whom disclosure is unnecessary. For example, the expense of building 
segregating partitions might be prohibitive, or secretive coverings or 
partitions might interfere with an assembly line or a manufacturing 
process. In such case it seems reasonable to allow an employer to choose 
a method of imparting legal secrecy which best suits his needs so long 
as the method chosen is reasonable. Therefore, in Healy where the subject 
matter was widely known and viewed in the plant, a reasonable method 
would have necessarily included constant warning and admonition of 
the confidentiality of the subject matter. 
Turning to the second condition required for trade secret status, an 
appropriate subject, a broad range of commercial matters may qualify. 
The Restatement factors relating to subject matter emphasize business 
value, investment, and ease of acquisition or duplication.77 Assuming for 
the moment that in Healy the employer had taken adequate steps to 
preserve secrecy, there appears to be a failure of proof on the issue of 
appropriate subject matter. Although it is clear that the alleged secret 
processes and dies were used in the employer's business, the Court stated 
specifically that the master's report was "quite indefinite as to what aspects 
or features he was finding to be trade secrets."78 If, as the Court implied, 
the master reported no finding related to business value, investment, or 
ease of acquisition or duplication, such lack of finding would seem to dis-
qualify the processes and dies on the ground that they were not shown 
to be proper subjects. 
Necessary to a discussion of appropriate subject matter is a considera-
tion of the special treatment afforded by the courts to employer's cus-
tomer lists. While customer lists may be included within the broad range 
of commercial matters which qualify as proper subjects, appropriation 
and use of such lists by ex-employees is recognized to be on the periphery 
of actionable trade secret law.79 This seems especially true where an ex-
employee has had substantial contacts, with his former employer's custo-
mers. For example, the "knowledge and skills" of a salesman should 
include his familiarity with and acceptance by his employer's customers. 
Thus, in DiAngeles v. Scauzillo80 the Court held that a bread salesman 
76 Id. at 397, 117 A.2d at 423. 
77 See text at note 61, supra, for a list of the factors. 
78 357 Mass. at 736, 260 N.E.2d at 729. 
79 Note, Competitive Torts, note 35, supra, at 955. See also Milgrim §2.09 at 
2-92. 
80 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934). 
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could lawfully join a competitor and solicit the customers of his former 
employer. The New York Court of Appeals in Town & Country House 
& Home Service, Inc. v. Newbery81 reached a different result in a case 
where the customer list of a home cleaning service had been developed 
solely by the employer's investment of both effort and dollars. The ex-
employees in N ewbery were not salesmen, but cleaners and supervisors 
whose knowledge of their employer's customers was not essential to their 
ability to earn a living. A deliveryman's interaction with customers 
demonstrates another distinction. One might expect from the preceding 
two examples that a deliveryman would not be enjoined from soliciting 
customers of a former employer if the particular deliveryman's knowledge 
of a customer list were essential to his ability to earn a living. His 
familiarity with and acceptance by the customers could thus be viewed 
as part of his general knowledge and skills which he may freely use. In 
practice, however, courts may decline to make the factual determination 
of essentiality, preferring instead to use the simpler rule that an em-
ployee may use a remembered list to his own advantage, but not a 
written copy of a list.82 While the memory test may seem arbitrary, it 
is, nonetheless, an approach commonly used by courts in cases involving 
customer lists.83 
It is difficult to determine exactly where the Massachusetts Court 
stands on customer lists, except to note that protection is more often 
denied to lists than granted.M In the frequently cited case of Woolley's 
Laundry, Inc. v. Silva85 the defendant, a laundry deliveryman, solicited 
60 customers of his former employer. Forty-seven of these customer's 
names were from lists furnished by his former employer, and thirteen 
had been solicited by the defendant as part of his specific duties as an 
employee. It was stipulated that the defendant had taken no written list. 
The Court ruled that if no list were taken, the employer could not 
prevail, adhering to the arbitrary memory test. The Court stated, how-
81 3 N.Y.2d 554, 147 N.E.2d 724, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328, (1958). 
82 It has been asserted that "[m]ost courts have therefore adopted the rule 
of the Restatement 0/ Agency (Second) that an ex-employee may use any part 
of a list which he can remember, providing he has not made a deliberate attempt 
to memorize it, but that he may not use a written copy of the list." Note, Com-
petitive Torts, note 35, supra, at 956 (footnote omitted). The author recognized 
that this rule has little merit other 'than as an arbitrary rule of law. Taking a 
list may be punishable by fine or imprisonment. See note 53, supra. 
83 Note, Competitive Torts, note 35, supra, at 956. 
M See, e.g., Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 23 N.E.2d 899 
(1939) (laundry route list); Horn Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 
N.E.640 (1929) (ice route); DiAnge1es v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 
(1934) (bakery route); Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 348 Mass. 623, 
205 N.E.2d 245 (1965) (customers for an elevator guide rail lubricator) ; Padover 
v. Axelson, 268 Mass. 148, 167 N.E. 301 (1929) (dyeing and cleaning business). 
Contra, New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 343 Mass. 69, 176 N.E.2d 193 
( 1961) (customer and supplier lists of clothing manufacturer) . 
85 304 Mass. 383, 23 N.E.2d 899 (1939). 
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ever, that "it would not have been difficult for the plaintiff to have 
imparted this knowledge under conditions that made it confidential. 
This was not done. The unexpressed intentions of the plaintiff cannot 
bind the defendant."86 Clearly the conditions under which the plaintiff 
imparted the infonnation would be irrelevant to and inconsistent with 
strict adherence to the memory test. The Court's obviously ambivalent 
attitude towards the memory test was precursive of its current position 
that the taking of any paper or list is merely "significant" not conclusive.87 
Perhaps the better reasoning for the Woolley's Laundrry decision is that 
the route man was a "quasi-salesman" because of his duty to solicit 
new customers and that his subsequent use of the customer list was a 
use of the product of his own skills and knowledge.88 
Applying the previously developed analytical technique to Jet Spray, 
the relational aspects will be considered first. All of the individual de-
fendants were fonner employees of Jet Spray who had held highly 
responsible positions.89 They were thus bound by an implied contract of 
confidentiality attaching to the employment relationship by operation of 
law.90 By virtue of their respective important positions all records and 
reports that would affect the manufacturing and sales functions of plain-
tiff's business were open to their inspection.91 The master found that 
the individual defendants "'understood that all such records and the 
infonnation contained therein were to be used by them in furthering 
the business interest of their employers [and that] [t]hey were also aware 
of the fact that it was important that competitors did not obtain the 
infonnation contained in these records.'''92 This would seem to imply 
that plaintiff intended to keep all manufacturing and selling infonnation 
confidential. However, the confidentiality of the employment relation 
and the mere intention to maintain confidentiality obviously do not 
satisfy the requirement of secrecy and appropriateness of the subject 
matter. 
There were two classifications of trade secrets in Jet Spray, technologi-
cal improvements and customer and supplier lists. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, agreeing with the trial judge's conclusion in his first interlocutory 
decree, held that the Foster-Miller report was a protectable trade secret. 
The Court further ruled that "[a]s to all infonnation, except the Foster-
Miller report, the master's findings disclose no proper and reasonable 
steps taken by the plaintiffs to protect the secrecy of the knowledge."93 
86 Id. at 390, 23 N.E.2d at 903. 
87 See 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1051, 282 N.E.2d at 924-25. 
88 See text at note 59, supra. 
89 Crampton had been national accounts manager; Landfield: comptroller, 
officer and director; Armstrong: chief engineer; and Thomson: purchasing agent. 
90 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1050, 282 N.E.2d at 924. 
91 Id. at 1049, 282 N.E.2d at 923. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1054, 282 N.E.2d at 926. 
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The master's report94 does not appear to contain any finding that ex-
pressed or implied that specific measures were taken to preserve the 
secrecy of the lists. Similarly there was no finding of the extent to which 
plaintiff's customer and supplier lists were known outside the business 
or the extent to which the information contained in the lists was known 
to employees or others involved in the business. Thus, it would seem 
that the plaintiff merely failed to prove that the lists were secret. 
If it is assumed that appropriate steps were taken to preserve secrecy 
and the appropriateness of the subject matter is considered there appears 
to be a similar failure of proof on that issue. The master made no specific 
finding that either list lent a competitive advantage or was of signi-
ficant value. Although some mailings were made to solicit new custo-
mers,95 there is no finding that any other investment of effort or money 
was made to develop the lists. The master did find that suppliers for 
the component parts of the dispensers could be found listed in various 
trade journals, books and other media.96 Whereas the names of several 
thousand prospective ultimate users of the dispensers were found avail-
able in a trade magazine,97 there was no finding of the extent to which 
the names of Jet Spray's wholesale customers could be properly ac-
quired or duplicated. Without findings in plaintiff's favor relating to 
these "subject matter" factors, the lists would not be appropriate subjects 
for trade secret protection. The fact that no actual lists belonging to 
plaintiff were found to have been taken would have some additional 
significance98 in the determination that the lists were not trade secrets 
misappropriated by the defendants. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court held that the technical improve-
ments recommended in the Foster-Miller report were trade secrets im-
properly used by defendants, it did not reach the same conclusion with 
respect to certain other technical improvements developed by plaintiff 
"in house." From the standpoint of appropriateness of subject matter 
these latter improvements do not appear distinguishable from those in 
the Foster-Miller report. Using the determinative factors outlined earlier, 
i.e., business value, investment, and ease of acquisition or duplication, 
both sets of improvements were being used in the business in the develop-
mental search for improvements to plaintiff's dispenser. The master 
found that by incorporating both the Foster-Miller and the "in-house" 
ideas into the plaintiff's products, a competitive advantage would be 
gained over other manufacturers,99 raising the inference that all im-
provements were valuable. Both the existence of an "in-house" develop-
ment program and the employment of consultants demonstrate plaintiff's 
94 The master's report appears in the Record at 25-50. 
95 Record at 30. 
96 Id. at 47. 
97 Id. 
98 See text at note 82, supTa. 
99 Record at 38-39. 
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investment of time, effort and financial resources.1OO At the time of the 
development of the Crathco dispenser, a Jet Spray dispenser with these 
particular improvements had not been marketed. 101 Consequently, the 
defendants could not have properly acquired an improved Jet Spray dis-
penser and duplicated it. Furthermore, the master found that it would 
take a competent engineer fifteen months to independently develop the 
Crathco dispenser without the Foster-Miller report and one year to de-
velop it with the aid of that report.102 Armstrong, with the aid of all 
the general skill and knowledge that he was entitled to use, plus the 
additional knowledge of the information in the Foster-Miller report and 
the "in-house" developments, had the Crathco dispenser in production in 
less than five monthsYY3 Moreover, incorporated into the design of the 
Crathco dispenser were all of the improvements referred to in the Foster-
Miller report as well as all the significant "in-house" developments. 104 
One key distinction between the improvements recommended in the 
Foster-Miller report and those developed "in-house" is that the former 
were developed by outside consultants hired for that purpose while the 
latter were developed at the direction of defendant Armstrong, plaintiff's 
former chief engineer.105 Previous discussion indicated that if an em-
ployee has contributed significant knowledge or skill in the development 
of a trade secret, any protection properly available to the former employer 
might not be enforceable against such employee. 106 One might expect 
such exception to be applicable in Jet Spray, thus minimizing the pro-
tection afforded to the in-house developments because Armstrong had 
contributed significant knowledge and skill of his own to the develop-
ment of those improvements. However, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Wireless Special Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co.107 recognized that 
where an employee is engaged solely for research and development in a 
specific field, such as Armstrong arguably was, a resulting invention is 
the property of the employer by implied agreement.l08 It is submitted 
that the in-house developments were appropriate subject matter for a 
trade secret, inasmuch as these developments were not distinguishable 
from the Foster-Miller recommendations when compared on the basis 
of business value, investment, and ease of acquisition or duplication. 
Considering the factors necessary to prove the remaining requirement 
of secrecy, the master's finding that all of the developments would give 
100 See Brief for Plaintiff at 27a, indicating that an offer of proof was made 
by plaintiff that $331,000 was spent between 1956 and 1962 for research and 
development. 
101 Record at 37. 
102 Id. at 46. 
103 Id. at 44, 46. 
104 Id. at 37-38. 
105 Id. at 37. 
106 See text at note 59, supra. 
107 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921). 
108 See also Milgrim §5.02 at 5-27. 
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Jet Spray a competitive advantage over other manufacturers109 suggests 
that neither the in-house developments nor those outlined in the Foster-
Miller report were known outside of plaintiff's business. Whereas there 
was no specific finding of the extent to which the distribution of either 
class of information was limited within the business, the Court's holding 
suggests that the information contained in the Foster-Miller report was 
limited to Armstrong, plaintiff's president Jacobson, and the consultants.110 
Similarly, distribution of the in-house information appeared to be limited 
to Armstrong, Jacobson and the consultants, all of whom constituted 
plaintiff's research and development group.11l Even though the in-house 
information was apparently available to the other individual defendants, 
they were aware that it was not to be disclosed. There is no indication 
that anyone else involved in the business knew of either class of informa-
tion. 
The extent of measures taken by the plaintiff to guard the secrecy of 
the information is not clear. Although the Court stated that the Healy 
case made it clear that one seeking trade secret protection "must demon-
strate that he pursued an active course of conduct designed to inform 
his employees that such secrets and information were to remain con-
fidential",l12 the Court ruled that the plaintiff's actions in procuring only 
one copy of the Foster-Miller report, which was retained by Jacobson 
and personally given to Armstrong, "clearly constituted sufficient and 
appropriate precautions to keep the report secret."113 Inasmuch as the 
record does not affirmatively show that delivery of a single copy of the 
Foster-Miller report was an intentional precaution114 and not simply a 
fortuitous happenstance, the Court's reliance on this particular event 
as an indication of an active course of conduct to preserve secrecy seems 
particularly misplaced. Apparently, there was no written report to be 
protected concerning the in-house developments. However, during an 
open house in the Jet Spray plant in 1960 the in-house developments 
were not made available for inspection, and visitors were excluded from 
the laboratory,115 unequivocally establishing that some active precaution-
ary measures were taken to protect the secrecy of the in-house develop-
ments. 
It does not appear that the Foster-Miller report was sufficiently dis-
tinguishable from the information concerning the in-house developments 
either in terms of the requirement for secrecy or with regard to appropri-
ateness of subject matter to warrant the granting of trade secret protection 
to the former while denying it to the latter. The in-house developments 
were not found to be disclosed to the entire plant as in the Healy case. 
109 Record at 38-39. 
110 See 'text at note 13, supra. 
111 Record at 33. 
112 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1053, 282 N.E.2d at 926. 
113 Id. at 1055, 282 N.E.2d at 927. 
114 Record at 37. 
115 Id. at 39. 
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The Court appeared to be giving "lip service" to the strict Healy re-
quirement that an active course of conduct be pursued to preserve 
secrecy, while demonstrating with its treatment of the Foster-Miller re-
port a retreat from a strict "active conduct" requirement. It is sub-
mitted, particularly in view of the finding that the individual defendants 
were aware of the confidential nature of the information,11s that the 
Court should have abandoned its strict "active conduct" requirement 
and afforded protection to the in-house developments as well as to the 
Foster-Miller report. That the Court justified its position by relying on 
a failure of proof of secrecy,117 points to the need for careful distinction 
of the factors in argument and in the brief and demonstrates the diffi-
cult problems of proof involved.118 
Trade secret law is an increasingly important alternative to other 
methods of protecting trade secret owners.119 Massachusetts has been 
criticized for not having a highly developed analytical law in this area,120 
a situation invariably leading to unfortunate decisions and unclear if not 
confusing opinions like Jet Spray and Healy. While the Jet Spray opinion 
should have resolved the difficulties that Healy created with the "constant 
warnings" requirement, it unfortunately seems to esta:blish a rule re-
quiring that an employer express to an employee that a confidential 
relationship is being created or exists121 contrary to prior Massachusetts 
law. It is doubtful that the Court was announcing a new rule without 
discussion because such a rule would be inconsistent, not only with prior 
law concerning the employment relationship, but also with the Jet Spray 
decision itself since there was no finding that a specific expression or 
agreement of confidentiality existed between the plaintiff and the de-
fendants with respect to the Foster-Miller report. 
It is submitted that the standards used by the Court to determine 
whether trade secret protection will be granted or not in a particular 
case are represented by the following summary outline of questions which 
can be developed from the foregoing discussion of cases: 
(A) Was the relationship of the parties confidential? 
116 See text at note 92, supra. 
117 See text at note 93, supra. 
118 See Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire---A Proposed Federal Solution, 50 
Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1966). "Because of its inordinate complexity, the law of 
trade secrets is unpredictable even within a particular jurisdiction." Id. at 1049. 
119 Milgrim §5.02 at 5·3. 
120 See Id. §5.02 at 5·37 n.98. 
121 See 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1052, 282 N.E.2d at 925, where the Court, 
citing Laughlin Filter Corp. v. Bird Mach. Co., 319 Mass. 287, 65 N.E.2d 545 
(1946), stated that" '[i]! the plaintiff considered that a confidential relationship 
was created, that had to be expressed or otherwise brought to the attention of 
the defendant.' I> (Emphasis in original.) Laughlin involved a licensor and licensee. 
Different considerations apply between employer and employee. The Court does 
not appear to be distinguishing between confidential relationships arising by agree· 
ment and those which arise by operation of law. 
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(1) Was there an express agreement of confidentiality or one 
implied by the conduct of the parties? 
(2) Was there an "agreement" implied by operation of law be-
cause of the inherent confidentiality of the relationship? 
(B) Was the subject matter appropriate for trade secret protection? 
(1) Was the matter used in the business? 
(2) Did it lend an opportunity for competitive advantage? 
(3) What was the value of the infonnation to the employer or 
to his competitors? 
( 4 ) What effort or money was expended in developing the infor-
mation? 
(5) How easily could the infonnation be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others? 
(6) Did the employee contribute significant knowledge or skill 
to the development of the trade secret? 
(C) Was the subject matter secret or nearly so and was secrecy main-
tained? 
(1) Was it generally known to the public at large? 
(2) To what extent was it known to employees and others in-
volved in the business? 
(3) What measures were taken to guard the secrecy of the in-
fonnation? 
(D) Are public policy aspects of particular importance? 
While these standards may be gleaned from the cases, the Court has 
failed in the recent Healy and Jet Spray decisions to carefully fonnulate 
and articulate the underlying basis for its decision. As a result, the Jet 
S pr:ay decision seems questionable with respect to the in-house develop-
ments. In addition, it may give further occasion for confusion in the 
trial courts on the question of the existence of a confidential relation-
ship.122 
ARTHUR O. STERN 
122 See Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 
595 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1971) for an example of confusion at the trial court level. 
In a written memorandum of decision, the trial judge interpreted Healy to re-
quire that an express agreement of confidentiality exist between employer and 
employee before trade secret protection will be granted. Id. at 612. This tS, of 
course, contrary ,to the rule followed in Jet Spray where it was recognized that 
an implied contract of non-disclosure existed between the employer and his em-
ployees by operation of law. See text at notes 28, 90, supra. 
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